This article develops an account of a theory of rational choice based on the conception of rationality as a normatively justified correspondence between interests and choices. In this conception, rationality is best thought of as a property not of individual actions, but of a complex two-level phenomenon comprised of the social justification of behavioral norms and of the everyday choices made under these norms.
Introduction
The core aspect of the concept of rationality that lies at the heart of the theory of rational choice is the optimal instrumental fit between actions and the interests they advance. When applied to individuals, it refers to a disposition for optimal choice: an agent displays rationality when she is disposed toward making choices that are optimal relative to a given set of preferences and information. According to a view that remains pervasive in formal work in political science, that disposition is exercised by choosing an optimal action following a direct and correct evaluation of the relative merits of alternative actions; a rational agent makes that choice because s/ he recognizes that, given those preferences and information, the choice in question is, indeed, optimal.
This view is, undoubtedly, very demanding, and so rational actor models often come with a proviso that goes something like the following: 'In truth, this is not really how we are making decisions or how we think that others are making decisions. There are underlying social factors that affect how (rational) choices are made that are missing from our formal representations of individual behavior but that can be asserted in support of those representations'.
Although not altogether implausible, this proviso implies a certain epiphenomenalism of what is, in the model, being posited as the causal account of an explanandum. In so doing, it raises concerns about both the causal relevance and the correct specification of the underlying account of choice making. No less importantly, it also begs a more general question about the interaction between relevant social factors, whatever they may be, and rational choices. In addition to social factors mattering in accounting for what looks like rational behavior, social factors, and in particular, social norms, are often invoked in accounting for behavior that appears to be less than entirely optimal. If those social factors do not induce rational choices in all instances of choice making, why do they do so in some instances but not in others? If those factors are responsible both for rational and for irrational behavior, then a theory of individual choice that invokes them implicitly, without a further account of the conditions under which those factors may be expected to produce the posited consequences, is, arguably, badly underspecified.
My goal in this essay is to sketch a more nuanced account of the relationship between social practices and individual rationality that supports variation in the individual-level optimality of choice. Since a number of accounts that could do this are likely possible, it is important to underscore two further methodological constraints -constraints that go beyond the requirements of psychological plausibility -that I believe a defensible account ought to satisfy. First, it must provide a model of rational explanation that explains individual behavior in terms of individual intentionalist ontology. That is, it must not treat individual preferences and beliefs as epiphenomenal; at the end of the day, a rational action explanation of behavior must hinge on the causal persuasiveness of the claim that, given the underlying preferences and beliefs, acting in a specified way is rational and that is why agents (rather than social puppeteers) will choose to act that way. Second, such an account must not be ad hoc in the following sense: the conditions that it posits as causing or distinguishing between expected optimal and expected suboptimal behavior must be independently falsifiable.
My point of departure in articulating such an account is the following observation by Dagfinn Fllesdal (1982: 309): 1 'Man has rationality as a norm, as a second-order disposition of the following kind: once one becomes aware that one has fallen into irrationality, one will tend to adjust one's belief, attitudes, and actions such as to make them more rational . . . Man is a rational animal in the sense that man has rationality as a norm'. In the account of rational choice I present, this positive responsiveness to the better argument is the crucial aspect of individual agency -definitive of the relationship between individuals and their social environment, and through that relationship, of what choices they make and how they go about making them. As a product of this agency, the identity of rational choice is determined on two distinct levels: (1) the justification of norms in a corresponding social setting, where rationality calls for a willingness to adjust one's view of the requirements of optimal choice in the light of appropriate evidence; and (2) the application of norms thus justified to a given choice situation, where a rational action is an action demanded by what the agent perceives to be a justified social norm for the situations of that kind. Thus, the content of social norms -of behavioral rules that are perceived, in light of their social justification, to be dictating optimal behavior -becomes a key determinant of the content of rational action.
In the next section, I outline the most prominent existing approaches to the relationship between social factors and rational behavior and develop a critique of these approaches that underscores the importance of the criteria articulated earlier. I then present two examples that provide some of the intuition for the alternative approach I defend. Next, I provide a sketch of the two-level account of rational choice that is at the core of that approach, followed by a brief discussion of its implications for several issues of particular significance to present-day work in rational choice social science. 
Rational Choice and the Social
The now standard model of rational behavior posits the existence of a causal relationship between an agent's preferences and beliefs and her action.
3 Its domain of application is rational agents -agents whose (1) preferences are weakly ordered (i.e., complete and transitive); (2) beliefs are updated efficiently (that is, are consistent with Bayes's Rule for updating prior beliefs about the probability of states of the world in light of new information) and knowledge satisfies logical omniscience (i.e., full awareness of all logical implications of all statements that are held true); and (3) choices are expectationally rational, given their preferences and beliefs. The basic explanatory claim of the theory is that agents who fit this notion of agency would choose a rational action because, given their beliefs about the relationship between their choices and the outcomes these choices would bring about, their 436 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18 (4) 2. Because the primary goal of this article is to create a logically sustained sketch of the foundational claims of what I take to be the most defensible account of rational action and demonstrate their/its (relative) appeal, I leave minimal the discussion of the models of learning in games that may be argued to be implementing some of the implications of the constructive arguments advanced below.
3. See Davidson (1980a). preferences are, indeed, best satisfied by the action chosen. Thus, given the underlying circumstances, including their preferences, beliefs, and the set of alternatives available to them, their (individual) rationality is sufficient to bring about the optimal choice. At least as a first approximation, the theoretical question about the interaction between social factors and the rationality of individual choice can be implicitly understood as a pragmatic question about the explanatory power of this theory. Is individual rationality in the three-part sense defined here sufficiently widespread to explain the universe of observations? How large is the domain of application of the explanatory theory that relies on that definition? To address these questions, social factors have been brought in to mediate, oppose, and delimit the reach of individual rationality.
Broadly speaking, one can distinguish between three prominent existing approaches to explaining individual behavior in terms of social factors. Two of these approaches focus on the social in the form of social norms. The third approach introduces social factors into the theory of rational choice as implied antecedents of rational behavior. 4 Each of these approaches captures plausible aspects of the relationship between social factors and individual rationality yet falls short of a fully satisfactory general account of that relationship.
The first of these three approaches posits social norms as an independent causal mover that produces behavior not reducible to individual optimization. In one of the prominent contemporary defenses of this view, Elster (1989: 125) argues 'for the reality of norms and for their autonomy. By the reality of norms I mean their independent motivating power. Norms are not merely ex post rationalizations of self-interest . . . They are capable of being ex ante sources of action. By the autonomy of norms I mean their irreducibility to optimization'. Following the norm is conceived as an outside constraint that is independent of the rational action: 'Often norms and self-interest coexist in a parallelogram of forces that jointly determine behavior. When the norms require me to do X and self-interest tells me to do Y, I may end up with a compromise' (p. 106). Hollis (1994: 185) provides a structurally similar account: 'the utilities attached to Jill's options when planning a party depend partly on what she herself wants and partly on normative context. We can think of these elements as successive filters, with the normative context yielding a menu of options and the particular choice being made from the menu by rational calculation'. Thus, social norms are seen as exogenous to the rational choice justification. They bind independently on the chooser, in effect, a priori delimiting the space within which utilitymaximizing action may operate.
Perhaps the most significant contributions of this view are to focus attention on the reality of norm following as a social practice and to offer a list of behavioral puzzles, many of which continue to defy explanation in terms of optimal choices given preferences and beliefs. But as an explanation of behavior this approach begs the question of when and why some individuals are, and others are not, subject to the causal force of social norms that are not reducible to optimization. 5 Nor is it clear what we should expect the 'compromise' between norms and rational action to be like -either as an ex ante behavioral prediction or as a normative guide to individual decision making.
A key comparative advantage of the second, game-theoretic, approach, is precisely its treatment of social norm-based behavior as qualitatively the same kind of object as any rational behavior. This unified framework provides a means of answering the question of when a social norm can be sustained, and so when it binds against what would otherwise have been the unconstrained optimal choices of the individuals subject to it. A norm constitutes an effective constraint only if the profile of actions or strategies that instantiate it is an equilibrium in the underlying strategic environment (Calvert, 1995; Schotter, 1981; Ullmann-Margalit, 1977) . In game-theoretic models of norms, agents' choices are constrained by other agents' equilibrium strategy choices. Agents' choices are also constrained by other agents' expectations, which are themselves induced by equilibrium play: e.g., in public goods contributions games, punishing others when it is costly to do so is rational because, in equilibrium, failing to do so may be subject to punishment as well; in a canonical stag-hunt game, the rationality of choosing to hunt a rabbit or a deer depends on what expectations a player has about others' behavior.
The effect of modeling norms as game-theoretic equilibria has, thus, been the rationalization of much norm-following behavior that, in the absence of equilibrium reasoning, must have seemed prima facie irrational. But, at the end of the day, the scope of explanations that the norms-as-equilibria approach is able to offer excludes behavior (some examples of which are discussed in the next section) that is best understood as caused by particular social norms that are not reducible to the equilibrium incentives of the rational agents in the standard sense of the term. To the extent that our ambition is to construct a theory that is able to create room for this variation, the norms-as-equilibria approach does not, at least without further theoretical edifice, fit the bill.
Unlike the first two approaches, the structural (or, as Satz and Ferejohn, 1994 , refer to it, the 'externalist') approach has little to say about social 438 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18 (4) 5. Indeed, Elster (1989: 125) himself notes, 'I cannot offer a positive explanation of norms. I do not know why human beings have a propensity to construct and follow norms . . .'. norms as explicit counterweights to or instantiations of individually rational behavior. It treats behavior as if it were on the basis of reasons, substituting a structural social ontology for the standard reason-(interests and beliefs) based explanation of individual behavior. This causal picture underscores the consequentialist view of rationality, which maintains that following the procedure of expected utility maximization is not a requirement of rational action. Instead, rationality is to be understood as a characteristic of 'any behavior that solves some optimization problem . . . independent of whether it comes about as the result of careful thought, or whether it comes about through tradition, routine, or in any other way. All that matters is the behavior's actual optimality' (Bo¨rgers, 1996 (Bo¨rgers, : 1375 . On this view, demanding proceduralism (that is, intentional optimization) is akin to demanding that soap bubbles follow optimization routines in choosing their optimal shapes: 'the weakness of the argument is obvious in that context, and the argument is similarly weak in the context of economics' (Bo¨rgers, 1996 (Bo¨rgers, : 1376 .
The consequentialist aspect of the structural approach has considerable appeal, not least because it is less demanding of individual agency than what I defined as the standard view. Moreover, the recent development of evolutionary game theory (e.g., Samuleson, 1998) provides us with a framework for the explicit analysis of the circumstances of convergence to Nash equilibrium behavior.
6 But in the end, this approach is too consequentialist. The analogy between soap bubbles and people breaks down because one of the primary needs that a rational explanation serves -a need that we have as socially positioned beings -is that of identifying what sort of thing people think they are doing when they take particular actions, whereas we have no such interest in the thoughts of soap bubbles. If we adopt the purely consequentialist account of rational behavior advocated by the structuralist approach, it is not clear how we could advance a satisfactory intentionalist rational explanation. The explanation that demonstrates that people behaved de facto optimally with respect to some kind of maximand would not really meet our explanatory needs, unless it is accompanied by an explanation of why they chose to associate those maximands with the particular actions chosen -an explanation that is expressly not provided by this approach. 6. See, though, Dickson (2006) who develops arguments that call into question the expectation that agents with Bayesian learning necessarily survive in the evolutionarily stable equilibria of coordination games.
7. Of course, if a consequentialist account of rational behavior is meant to serve as a supplement to and not a replacement for the intentionalist account, one is left wondering when and why one of these accounts binds rather than the other, and the criticism raised in the referenced paragraph applies throughout.
If one gives up the intentionalist aspect of rational behavior, and with it, the causal weight of the agency that would choose a rational action because, given the relevant beliefs, its preferences are best satisfied by the action chosen, one begs the question, 'why that action, given the motivation (preference)?' This question is of fundamental, even decisive, importance. A map from motivations into actions serves two purposes: First, it establishes an agent's competence as someone whose reasons for action are sufficient to cause her (relevant) behavior. If we give up either the knowledge or the assumption of such competence, both the moral status of the agents and of our own responses to their behavior would change dramatically. Second, even though the considerations of causal relevance require us to identify reasons for action independent of the action taken, 'beliefs and desires', as Donald Davidson (1980c: 216) observes, 'issue in behavior only as modified and mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings, without limit'. Without the map from motivations into actions, the true identity of the effective motivation becomes, in and of itself, very ambiguous. Creating such a map, however, means re-building the intentionalist structure of rational individuals' responses to their environment.
8 Unless one is prepared to offer an alternative conception of rationality, which consequentialists have been reticent to do, giving up the intentionalist interpretation of optimality is giving up the only tool available to an explanatory rationalist.
Rationality and Community: Two Examples
In this section I describe two examples the properties of which provide a key intuition for the two-level account of rational choice sketched in the subsequent section. In both examples, the individual choices made are clearly suboptimal given the actors' preferences and the efficient use of the information available to them, yet in both examples labeling their behavior, and even more so the actors themselves, 'irrational' seems odd. The reasons why that is so point to what I believe is one of the key pieces missing from the standard account of rational choice -the cognitive dimension of social norms.
Consider the 'battle of the sexes' game in Figure 1 , with payoffs expressed in dollars. This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria, ðT; LÞ and ðB; RÞ, with obvious distributive asymmetries. Suppose now that, before the play of the game, Player 1 has an opportunity to publicly burn a onedollar bill. Player 1 has, then, four possible pure strategies: burn a dollar 440 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18 (4) 8. See the argument in Dowding (2002) .
and choose T ; burn a dollar and choose B; do not burn a dollar and choose T; and do not burn a dollar and choose B. Similarly, Player 2 now has four pure strategies as well, since she can condition her choice of L or R on whether Player 1 has burned a dollar or not: L whether Player 1 has burned the dollar or not; R if she has not burned a dollar and L if she has; etc. In the normal form of this transformed game (see Figure 2) , the actions that correspond to the subgame in which Player 1 burns the dollar are designated by the 'prime'.
By successively eliminating weakly dominated strategies (in sequence B 0 ; RR 0 ; LR 0 , B, RL 0 , T 0 Þ, we obtain ðT; LL 0 Þ as the unique equilibrium prediction. The possibility of burning a dollar without actually burning it is, thus, sufficient to ensure that Player 1's preferred equilibrium is played. 9. This example is introduced in van Damme (1989) and further developed in Rubinstein (1991) , but neither author need feel implicated in the uses to which it is being put here. Suppose now that neither player realizes that the possibility of Player 1 burning a dollar has the distributive consequences described earlier, and so, in effect, considers it to be broadly irrelevant. Then the players behave as if the game they are playing is the one captured in the first matrix. Clearly, this outcome is a consequence of the players' effectively placing probability 0 on the possibility of there being a positive effect for Player 1 of considering and making common knowledge her option of burning a dollar bill. But so long as neither player is aware of the possibility of burning a dollar, there is a set of mutually consistent beliefs that yields common knowledge among the players of the first game, and we can adequately explain their behavior by analyzing that game.
Consider now another example whose relatively generic features cover a wide class of non-acratic behavioral anomalies. Members of a legislative body are voting on a particular amendment to a bill under consideration. If members of party X, who dislike the bill and even more so the amendment, vote for the amendment, then they would cause the adoption of the amendment. This, in turn, would make the bill less palatable to its supporters and, indeed, ensure its failure. To achieve their ultimate objective of defeating the bill, members of X should, then, vote in favor of the amendment -a course of action that is obvious to the experienced legislators.
10 Suppose that members of X include a rookie-legislator who both knows the preferences of all legislators and shares the preferences of other members of X, and who knows that she is facing no electoral constraints requiring a record of voting against the amendment. When the vote is taken, this legislator votes against the amendment, sincerely registering her dissatisfaction with its content. The result of voting is that the amendment is rejected by one vote. When asked to explain her vote, the legislator responds that it is a rational implication of her disliking the amendment and of her belief that by voting against it, she is making its adoption less likely. The legislator's own explanation of her action is certainly both rational and causally efficacious, but it is also both uninteresting on its own and clearly unsatisfactory as an explanation of what happened, given what we know about the relationship between the passage of the bill and of the amendment and the state of the legislator's knowledge.
It is worth emphasizing here that while explanation of an action may be said to carry with it a rationalist bias, in that we interpret an action in the light of what we take to be the actor's intentions, 'rationalization' is not synonymous with 'producing a satisfactory rational explanation'.
11 (In the 442 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18 (4) 10. Suppose that difficulties of explaining the vote to the electorate, whch may sometimes keep the legislators from voting strategically, are not binding here.
11. I thank Keith Dowding for pressing me on this point. preceding example, the legislator's dislike of the amendment and her belief that she could make its passage less likely by voting for it rationalizes her action. It does not provide a satisfactory rational explanation in that it does not explain her inadequate comprehension of her strategic environment.) The more we know about the agents (or the preferences of the general type to which the agent belongs), the less justifiable the identity between 'rationalization' and 'rational explanation' seems. In the context of the classic problem of translation, these notions can be thought of as the same, but in standard explanatory contexts in social science we often know what it is the agents think they are doing even when it is clear that what they are doing is suboptimal relative to what they themselves would consider their (dominant) preferences and the efficient use of the information available to them. Leaving the explanation at rationalization would be deeply unsatisfactory, indeed, question begging if it is at odds with other beliefs that we know the relevant agents (or agents of the same type in similar situations) to have. To produce a satisfactory rational explanation, we need to have non-ad hoc account for how those agents manage to maintain such inconsistent beliefs.
What is striking about the difference between the burning the dollar and the amendment voting examples is the different relationships between individual actions and communal perceptions that they exhibit. If other legislators -in particular, members of our rookie legislator's coalition -have assigned a positive probability to the possibility of her not knowing the correct causal model, we would certainly expect them to have communicated it to her. In the example, however, this does not happen, and this must leave the observer perhaps even more puzzled about the social setting of the described interaction than, in a strict sense, about the rationality of the legislator herself. (She is a rookie legislator, after all, and if something as important as a pivotal vote with consequences for the entire coalition calls for a special consideration on her part, shouldn't we expect her more experienced colleagues to alert her to it?) As in the dollar-burning example, our perceptions of individual rationality here appear to depend on what we expect the agents' community to do or have done. This intuition is a key feature of the two-level account of rational choice sketched later. But this account must go beyond the assertion that 'behaving thus was the norm for the relevant group', for though that may, indeed, be true, it would be question begging unless we have a nonad hoc micro-level theory that tells us something about the relationship between norms and individually optimal choices. To make that explanation work, we need a theory that both accounts for the agents' perceptions of norms as identifying best courses of action and delimits the set of stable and compelling norms ax ante.
A Two-level Theory of Rational Choice
The Social Ontology of Rationality
The central contention of this section is that rationality is best viewed as a product of two distinct practices in which agents participate with an (instrumentally rational) disposition to obtain the best fit between their preferences and beliefs and their actions. The first of these practices entails the justification of the behavioral norms that dictate individual responses to specific classes of social situations. The second practice consists of following those norms when agents perceive themselves to be in a corresponding situation. Although the relationship between these two practices is hierarchical, with the justifiability of relevant norms implying their normative force over particular choice circumstances, this hierarchy is one with a bottom-up feedback: one should expect a considerable amount of normative adjustment in light of the consequences of individual choices, both one's own and others'.
One of the most distinctive features of this structure is the particular relationship it posits between individual choices and behavioral norms. In the account I am proposing, individual choices are considered rational because (though not only because) they are governed by norms that are perceived as rationally justifiable. From the standpoint of this view, the account of norms as exogenous constraints delimiting the space of rational action fails to appreciate (1) that (stable) norms must be supported by a profile of mutually rational behavioral choices (including the behavior of those agents whose choices are constrained by the norms), and (2) that the rational response to constraint has a normative force itself.
A norm is at once a stable behavioral pattern and a binding imperative, but it will not be stable if it is not binding, and it cannot be binding if a party that is supposed to be subject to it believes that it would be better off acting differently. A norm, thus, is only a norm if the set of behavioral recommendations supporting it is perceived to be the best way to behave by all relevant parties -that is, if it is an equilibrium of perceptions. (The 'best way to behave' is not, of course, the same as the 'unconstrained best', but it is the best we think we can do given our expectations of what others will do.) In this sense, if expectations really do constrain i 's actions, then i 's perceived rational response is normative for i. Provided that the other agents see no reason to change their actions (i.e., provided that the behavioral pattern really is stable), the set of actions that is at once a stable behavioral pattern and a binding behavioral imperative includes those of agent i: Thus, to say that a norm is a constraint on agent i is to refer to an incomplete specification of what might be called an effective norm (that is, an equilibrium profile of supporting strategies, including that of agent i ) -even if saying that is sensible as imparting information about i 's ranking of all possible states. 444 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18 (4) As the observation by Fllesdal cited in the introduction suggests, an agent's perception of the rational justifiability of a course of action implies its normativity for that agent. Indeed, that normativity makes it difficult to make sense of the possibility of preferring to behave differently. A rational agent cannot be choosing whether to act in way x beyond what enters into the formation of the belief that x is the rational way to act: when that belief is affirmed, the choice, as Joseph Raz (1999: 72) puts it, 'must be automatic, rather than a product of [further] deliberation and decision'.
To behave normatively, with norms understood as behavioral rules that are perceived, in light of the social justification, to be dictating optimal behavior, is to behave in a way that is perceived to be rational, but what makes this rational behavior normative and the rational response 'automatic' is the 'paradigmatic' status of the circumstances of choice with respect to the relevant behavioral norms. This status underscores the role of the second practice that the two-level account associates with rationality -the recognition of provisional 'fixed points' of rational justification as normatively binding under the appropriate circumstances. The coherence of this practice relies on the individual's ability to interpret the relevant circumstances of choice against the background of her own normative knowledge: the ability to recognize such circumstances 'for what they are' (that is, as the circumstances that fit a particular type or situational paradigm) and to identify the relevant norms that should govern them. Rational individuals are, thus, expected to adopt behavioral responses suitable to the immediate choice circumstances by interpreting those circumstances in light of the accessible situational paradigms associated with particular justifiable behavioral norms.
12 This implies a distinctly Wittgensteinian notion of normative behavior, whereby 'to be rational is to follow an appropriate rule appropriately' (Hollis, 1996: 76) . As an account of behavior, this notion seems very different from choosing a rational action because, given beliefs about the relationship between choices and outcomes, one's preferences are, indeed, best satisfied by the action chosen, but in fact, and contrary to Wittgenstein's own view, it requires no commitments that are antithetical to the instrumental concept of rationality.
The rules we follow may be thought of as claims of the sort 'in circumstances of the kind x (where x includes a description of interests), a rational response is y'. Such rules acquire the appearance of rational justifiability through the process of normative justification. While the individual actions activated by such rules need not be unconscious attempts to apply them, it LANDA: RATIONAL CHOICE AS SOCIAL NORMS 445
12. See Pettit (1993) for the development of the paradigm-recognition theory of rule following.
described as 'blind rule following', but in the social ontology of decision making that yields rational behavior. 13 In the two-level account, when rational actors choose an option that has a utility-maximizing property, they, in a paradigmatic scenario, do not engage in an action called 'maximizing expected utility'. Rather, they pick an action that maximizes expected utility because that action does, at that point, happen to be the norm of behavior for rational agents and so explains why they, as rational agents, adopt it. This does not, of course, preclude those for whom the exercise of expected utility maximization is a normative response from applying the rules of expected utility maximization while someone else is simply picking the same outcome because it 'maximizes expected utility'. Indeed, several mutually consistent norms may simultaneously point to the desirability of behaviorally indistinguishable responses.
Justification and Optimization
In the standard account of the theory of rational choice, the researcher and the actor share the same viewpoint. Correspondingly, utility maximization is at once a predictive device (for the researcher) and a behavioral rule (for the actor). It is normative in that, as a behavioral prescription of the rational choice, it is binding on the rational actor. Because it is so binding, and because actors are assumed to be rational, it becomes an explanation for their choices. By contrast, in the two-level account, the identity of the actor with the researcher is broken. Although the actor does seek to make the best choice, she may or may not determine what 'best' is by resorting to the calculus of expected utility maximization. Instead, the actor may choose in accordance with a rule that she believes dictates the best choice in the given circumstances -a rule which she may modify given further information. Consequently, the researcher's ability to ascertain the coherence of the actor's decisions and actions is mediated by her understanding of that actor's operative norms and justificatory environment at the time of the action. The key supporting causal claim of the two-level account goes as follows: 'any rational agent i who belonged to i 's justificatory community should, when in a situation of a given kind, be expected to do a'. Whether a turns out to be a utility-maximizing option seems, in that account, a matter that may have as much to do with the researcher's ability to give a coherent explanation account as it does with i 's rationality. In any case, it seems too hasty to assume that i's norms in relation to the situation in question are like ours, even if they must, ultimately, be like ours in relation to some other related situation: the price of the wrong attribution is identifying as causes events that may be causally irrelevant.
14
The two-level account of rationality also offers a distinct interpretation of the optimization analysis that is standard in formal-theoretic explanations. In a nutshell, the idea is that the utility-maximizing property of choices is a limiting property of a sequence of historical explanations; if utility is understood as a measure increasing in the extent of correspondence between interests and action, then, in the limit, the justifiability of norms must be ultimately expressible in the traditional language of rational choice theory, utility maximization. However, like the historical explanations (of individual actions), this extension of the two-level account relies on additional conditions for the causal relevance of such limit-based explanations.
The intuition behind these conditions is as follows: what determines the causal relevance of the (optimal) limiting properties is the possibility of a society in which the cumulative social experience of rationality-seeking individuals propels to prominence norms that are proof against the criticism of their individual suboptimality. In addition to social experience, the existence of such a society requires what may be characterized as the 'absence of epistemic totalitarianism'. Perhaps the distinguishing feature of a totalitarian society (separating it from, among others, an authoritarian one) is that its members are not only not permitted to act in accordance with their (primitive) interests, but the pressure of social ideology is also such that they are kept from discovering the best ways of pursuing those interests. Clearly, in such a society -be it consciously designed or spontaneously evolved -behavior that is consistent with utility maximization in a number of circumstances of interest to social scientists is less likely. When totalitarianism so construed is ruled out, the basic explanatory and predictive claim of the two-level account is that individually rational behavior is, in the limit, representable by the analytical structure of utility maximization.
The qualification 'representable' in this formulation captures the fact that, in the two-level account of rational choice, utility maximization is the explainer's, rather than the participants', view of the events. Nevertheless, the 'as if ' preface that may be applied to it does not connote the causal 448 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 18 (4) 14. Donald Davidson's defense of the interpretive principle of charity should not be mistaken, as it sometimes is, for the view that our comprehension of other persons' actions requires us to believe that these actions stand in an optimizing relation to their desires. Once the parties share the common language, what is required is that on some core level we take these persons to mean to be doing what it is that we think, in a thinly descriptive sense, they are doing: really mean to be saying 'tiger' when they see a rabbit, casting a vote in a way x as opposed to way y, and so on. As Davidson (1980b: 273) himself notes, rational intentional explanations should, when they are properly understood, tell us more about the persons whose behavior they are explaining than merely epitomize the conditional behavioral characteristics of mankind.
irrelevance of the sort implicit in a Milton Friedman-like position on theory as merely a prediction-generating 'language'. Rather, in the two-level account, the formal-theoretic optimization exercise identifies what (stable) norm may be expected to operate in relation to a given circumstance by falling back on the causal theory of why that norm would come about. Because agents seek to make the best choice, choosing the means they believe to be best suited to reaching their goals, they are, indeed, rational. Because these rational agents modify the rules they live by, the only stable expectation that social scientists can have of these rules, given the absence of limits on learning and experimentation, is that these rules would correspond to utility-maximizing behavior. To the extent that we are interested in stable outcomes, expected utility maximization is a predictive device without peer.
Learning, Institutions, and Equilibria
In what follows I sketch the implications of the two-level account of rationality for several issues that are of immediate relevance to present-day work in political science and economics.
Analysis of Political Institutions
The limit-of-justification rationale for expected utility maximization points strongly toward the value of formal-theoretic rational choice analyses for the study of social and political institutions. One of the distinguishing features of institutions is the repeated nature of the interactions they frame. This has the effect of elevating a particular incentive structure to the level of a (publicly accessible) social paradigm and so of encouraging the (faster) convergence to optimal choice making within this structure by the involved parties. This, in turn, makes the expectation of the outcomes associated with optimal decision-making within a given institution highly relevant for normative theories of institutional design. The two-level account of rational choice may, thus, be seen as providing a behavioral justification for this focus on institutions.
Non-Bayesian Learning and Deliberation as Self-discovery
The greater behavioral consistency of the two-level account also suggests its particular relevance for recent work concerned with the behavioral foundations of individual decision making in strategic settings, including the articles in this symposium. This work includes increasingly common models in which agents are not logically omniscient. Although such models sometimes deliver greater behavioral plausibility, their status as contributions to rational choice LANDA: RATIONAL CHOICE AS SOCIAL NORMS 449 but also on the ability of agents to correctly guess the strategic choices of their counterparts. Such guesses, however, go beyond the definition of individual rationality, and so the assumption that they are correct appears ad hoc. Setting this assumption aside means not being able to go beyond the profiles of rationalizable strategies -strategies that are best responses for at least some kind of beliefs about the other player(s)' choices. Such profiles are typically highly irresolute as predictive devices, making them rarely useful for applied work. The two-level account of rationality offers a way out of this difficulty. Although it does not imply that we should necessarily expect behavioral convergence to Nash equilibrium strategies (a matter to be resolved in explicit strategic models of adaptive learning), it can be shown to support the view that if a stable prediction exists, we are, indeed, justified in expecting it to be a Nash equilibrium. The argument turns on the ontological status of a justifiable norm in the limiting case of justifiability -when no norm can be argued to be superior to the one adopted. To act justifiably rationally is to act in accordance with behavioral injunctions that are not susceptible to being displaced by an argument in favor of a different injunction. The only behavioral norms against which such arguments cannot be made are the strategies that are best responses to each other -that is, strategies that comprise the Nash equilibria of the underlying games.
Whenever the resulting strategy profile does not constitute a Nash equilibrium, some agent(s) must have been motivated by a replaceable (unstable) norm.
17 It follows that the Nash equilibrium strategies must be the only predictors in the set of stable behavioral predictors for those games. When a Nash equilibrium is reached, no member of one's justificatory community is in a position to make a convincing correcting argument -in effect, all members of that community could be thought of as having accepted as final the authority of the same (equilibrium-consistent) set of instructions for how to play the underlying game.
Conclusion
The key argument of this article is that both the notion of rationality and the causal claim on its behalf that animate the standard formulation of the LANDA: RATIONAL CHOICE AS SOCIAL NORMS 451
17. In the course of learning the norm, agents are also, of course, learning what can be expected of others, and that knowledge reinforces the normative status of their corresponding behavioral prescription. Significantly, agents who follow the rules of expected utility maximization and know that others are normatively inclined (toward a particular equilibrium play), are also being informed of the correct expectations of others. They, too, should, therefore, rationally prefer to choose the corresponding Nash equilibrium strategy. theory of rational choice are unnecessarily constraining. There exists an alternative set of microfoundations that supports that theory, while also enabling it to provide explanations for a range of suboptimal behaviors that fall outside the scope of traditional rational choice explanations. Adopting a broader conception of rationality that relies on these microfoundations requires recognizing that individuals are operating within justificatory communities, the histories of which may play a substantial role in determining what they consider to be a rational action at any given time. But recognizing their behavior as rational does not mean being unable to acknowledge the normative difference between it and the optimal choices from which that behavior may deviate.
